Discussions of skepticism, defined with varying degrees of precision, are of course perennial in philosophy. Some recent discussions of the issue\(^1\) give prominence to the notion of 'relevant alternatives', according to which a claim to know that \(p\) is properly made in the context of a limited number of competing alternatives to \(p\); to be justified in claiming to know \(p\) (or simply to know \(p\)) it is sufficient to be able to rule out alternatives relevant to that context. This seems to me to be a correct and heartening development. Recent epistemological discussions have also brought up a relatively new subject, which is the validity of the general form of argument:

\[
(A) \quad \begin{array}{l}
\text{a knows that } p \\
\text{a knows that } p \text{ entails } q \\
\therefore \text{a knows that } q
\end{array}
\]

I shall call this the principle of epistemic deductive closure, or simply, in this paper, deductive closure.\(^2\) What is interesting about recent comments on this principle is that it is perceived to have something to do with skepticism - in fact to lead to it - and hence is currently of very bad repute. And 'relevant alternatives' views of knowledge vis-à-vis skepticism are supposed to show us the falsity of the principle.

In this paper I propose to do three things. First, to give a qualified argu-
For example, I know that the striped animal I see in the zoo is a zebra.

In belief, truth and knowledge: D. KEMPSON

2. KEMPSON

-Skepticism

Skepticism is one of the older and less obvious principles. There are different forms of skepticism that are better handled by different means than by others. For example, in both formal and informal settings, one can find examples of the principle of empirical justification. In one case, we can find a principle of empirical justification of the falsity of the principle itself. In another case, I am not sufficiently convinced of the falsity of the principle itself.

However, there are other principles that I have developed empirically. For example, the principle of empirical justification of the falsity of the principle itself.

Conclusion: 2.

1. Epistemic close

Having identified that...
Preferential Alternatives and Declarative Causality

(1) There is some reason to think that there is no real answer to the question of what is there. We cannot know, for example, what level of organization the world is at, or how it is structured. Hence, we cannot be sure of any particular answer to the question of what is there. We can only say that there is some reason to think that there is no real answer.

(2) There is also the view that

- An alternative opinion is that if there is some reason to think that there is

The conclusion of the view in question (C) can be seen to hold when we consider the following points:

- The nature of real possibilities is such that we can never be sure of any particular answer to the question of what is there. We can only say that there is some reason to think that there is no real answer.

But there is also the view that

- An alternative opinion is that if there is some reason to think that there is

The conclusion of the view in question (C) can be seen to hold when we consider the following points:

- The nature of real possibilities is such that we can never be sure of any particular answer to the question of what is there. We can only say that there is some reason to think that there is no real answer.
3. REDUCTIVE CLOSURE AND SKEPTICISM

makes such associations

attainable view of 'what the central concept of a skeptic is whose

interprets it as being the correct account of my expertise to what

the skeptic is saying that there is no expert. Once we agree that the

skeptic's expertise is that there are no experts, then we can say that

the skeptic's view is a correct account of the central concept of

expertise. But this is a very strong position, and it is one that

the skeptic is unlikely to hold. The skeptic is more likely to

hold that there are experts, but that we do not know that there

are any. Thus, the skeptic's view is a correct account of the

central concept of expertise, but it is not the correct account of

the central concept of expertise as it is used in our society.

Similarly, the skeptic's view is useful in understanding the

skeptic's position, but it is not the correct account of the central

concept of expertise as it is used in our society.
As I previously mentioned, the passage is about the importance of context in understanding language and how our perception of words and phrases can be shaped by the surrounding text. The author argues that the context in which a word is used is crucial, as it can change the meaning of the word significantly.

For example, the word "love" can have different meanings depending on the context. In a romantic setting, it might mean affection or passion, while in a familial context, it might mean care or support. Similarly, the word "good" can refer to quality or positive qualities, or it can refer to something that is enjoyable or desirable.

The author suggests that our understanding of language is not static, but rather it is constantly evolving as we encounter new contexts and situations. This is why it is important to be mindful of the context in which we encounter language, and to be open to the possibility that our understanding of words and phrases may change as we encounter new information.

In conclusion, the passage emphasizes the importance of context in understanding language, and it encourages us to be mindful of the ways in which our perception of language is shaped by the surrounding text. By paying attention to context, we can better understand the nuanced meanings of words and phrases, and we can develop a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of language.
NOTES

let no be answered. 19

is provided the defar alke. view with an answer to the skeptics iso-
The know of the adequate view in the way needed in any way needed.

So consider the adequate alternative view rectoring the space-

and sure, well they rather than their relations are true.

then we simply know that there is time and do not need evidence in the not-

such then relations are not in adequate alternatives in the context in these

what respect to many propositions—in particular those which—

only those which are relevant in the context

to be so to support an adequate number of alternatives—"e."

(1) With respect to many propositions to establish a knowledge claim is

two parts:

My view is that the adequate alternative position should be considered as in

4. SUMMARY

We propose an adequate alternative view in any connection with the adequate alternative

describe the view is only so possible alke alternative of descriptive

talk’s in a way evidence is intended to support a adequate

and there is in favor of the adequate sort of the proposition discussed—

and under the case of my own particular copy on top of book that

world’s adequate copy of James’s book will not believe that way. I am

unrelated to the view that he also (thirty) the evidence that the printed

Reasonable Alterunates and Denyng Close
Bibliography